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After gaining its independence from France in 1953, 
Cambodia, like many other newly independent 
countries, had to face the new escalating global 
problem of the time:  the Cold War. As far as Cambodia 
was concerned, the effects of the Cold War were 
discernible from the outset,  with the formation of the 
Indochinese Communist Party in 1951 in Vietnam and 
its influence on the communist movement in 
Cambodia. However, it was not ideological conflict 
alone that accounted for the destruction of Cambodia 
in the following decades. Michael Leifer,  for instance, 
notes: “Ever since the decline of the ancient Khmer 
Empire, geography has combined with politics to 
shape the fortunes of the Cambodian state.”1 Similarly, 
British journalist William Shawcross also writes: 
“Cambodia is a victim of its geography and of its 
political underdevelopment.”2  This essay therefore 
intends to examine the main factors that were crucial to 
the development of Cambodian geopolitics during the 
Cold War era. I would argue that the geopolitics of 
Cambodia from 1953 to 1991 is characterized mainly by 
three factors: the Vietnam War, the legacy of  French 
colonial rule, i.e. the country’s territorial disputes with 
her neighbors, and finally, the rivalry of hegemonic 
powers in the region as well as the politics of the Cold 
War itself.
The Impact of the Vietnam War   
In order to better understand the key points of 
discussion in this paper, it is  useful to offer a definition 
of “geopolitics.” In the context of this paper, 
geopolitics refers to the influences of  geography on 
politics,  i.e., the relationships that exist between a 
country's politics and its  geography, or the influences 
that geography has on political relations between 
countries.3
As the development of the Cold War polarized the 
globe, Cambodia, like the rest of the world, had to 
come to terms with the new political landscape. After 
successfully demanding Cambodia’s  independence 
from France in 1953, King (later Prince) Norodom 
Sihanouk tried to pursue neutralist policy with the 
hope of keeping his country out of war, while 
continuing to accept financial support from rival 
powers. Eventually,  however, Sihanouk’s foreign 
policy began to shift towards the left, so that he was 
labeled “procommunist” by the United States.4 
Sihanouk’s decision to align himself with the left 
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stemmed from his belief  that the communists would 
finally win the Indochina war. Additionally, the prince 
displayed distrust toward Thailand and South Vietnam, 
two countries that were backed by the U.S. in this 
period. Internally, his move was an attempt to diminish 
the leftists’ opposition, but it also had the effect of 
alienating the right wing of his  government, especially 
army officials.  In fact, in 1963,  Sihanouk decided to cut 
off U.S. economic and military assistance, which had 
totaled about US$404 million since the country gained 
independence. Moreover, he nationalized Cambodia’s 
banks and the country’s export-import trade.5 By 1965, 
Cambodia broke off relations all together with the 
United States, meanwhile turning to China for 
international alliance.  In fact,  as early as 1955, 
Sihanouk’s rejection of the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) already won him economic 
support from China and political support from the Viet 
Minh (the communists of North Vietnam).6 In 1966, 
Prince Sihanouk made a move that was to become a 
factor leading to the coup against him in 1970. 
Perceiving that the North Vietnamese would win its 
war against the United States, Sihanouk secretly allied 
himself  with the North Vietnamese. To quote from 
David Chandler:
Under the terms of the alliance, the North 
Vietnamese were allowed to station troops in 
Cambodian territory and to receive arms and 
supplies funneled to them from North Vietnam and 
China via the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. In 
exchange, they recognized Cambodia’s frontiers, 
left Cambodian civilians alone, and avoided contact 
with the Cambodian army. South Vietnamese and 
U.S. officials soon knew about the presence of 
North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and the 
movements of weapons and supplies, without 
knowing the details of the agreement Sihanouk had 
reached. Sihanouk denied for several years that any 
Vietnamese troops were in Cambodia, which 
angered the United States and South Vietnam but 
enhanced the image of injured innocence that the 
prince projected to the outside world.7
It was under such circumstances that the so-called 
“Sihanouk Trail”–the southern terminus of the more 
widely known “Ho Chi  Minh Trail”–came into being. 
The trail,  cutting through Laos and Cambodia, served 
as the logistical supply route utilized by the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAV) and its southern supporters, 
the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong). The 
emergence of the Vietnamese sanctuaries on 
Cambodian territories resulted in the U.S. secret 
bombing missions authorized by President Nixon. 
According to historian John Tully, the U.S. dropped 
almost 540,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia during 
the first half of the 1970s,  exceeding the total of 
160,000 tons of bombs dropped by the Allies on Japan 
in all of World War II.8  Estimates of the death toll 
range widely from 150,000 to the U.S. historian 
Chalmers Johnson’s perhaps inflated estimate of 
750,000.9  
On March 18, 1970, while Sihanouk was abroad, the 
National Assembly of Cambodia voted 86-3 to remove 
Sihanouk from power. The U.S.-supported Khmer 
Republic was eventually proclaimed, with General Lon 
Nol as its Prime Minister. There is no direct evidence 
to support the claim that the U.S. was behind the coup; 
yet, it was clear that the U.S. was supporting Lon Nol’s 
government thanks to its military strategy in the 
Vietnam War.  Among Cambodians, the 1970 coup was 
more popular among educated people in Phnom Penh 
and the army, who were upset with Sihanouk’s 
handling of the economy and the rupture with the 
United States.  In the rural areas, however, people were 
still in favor of Sihanouk.10   Nevertheless,  as David 
Chandler noted, for most people the idea that 
Vietnamese forces should leave Cambodia was more 
popular than the coup itself.11  In fact, when the 
Vietnamese ignored Lon Nol’s ultimatum that they 
leave Cambodian territory in forty-eight hours,  tens of 
thousands of Cambodians joined the armed forces to 
drive the Vietnamese out, only to be defeated by the 
more experienced Vietnamese combatants.12  
Meanwhile,  Lon Nol’s army was not only fighting 
against the Vietnamese, but also against the 
Cambodian communists–the Khmer Rouge. 
It is useful to note here that while the bombing 
missions by the U.S.  on Cambodia’s eastern parts had 
the effect of postponing the Communists’  victory, it 
also drove some peasants to join the Khmer Rouge in 
the jungle, while many others fled to the capital Phnom 
Penh. Yet, not everyone who joined the Khmer Rouge 
was communist. Some went into the jungle to fight for 
exiled Prince Sihanouk who–now allying himself with 
his former enemy, the Khmer Rouge–encouraged his 
people to fight against Lon Nol.
When the U.S. lost the Vietnam War and finally 
withdrew its troops from Indochina, the Khmer 
Republic, without any more support from the U.S., was 
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left on its own and finally collapsed when the Khmer 
Rouge took over Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975. 
Between 1975 and 1979 Cambodia was renamed 
“Democratic Kampuchea” under the leadership of 
Saloth Sar–the man who came to be more widely-
known as Pol Pot. Despite the fact that it was short-
lived, Democratic Kampuchea was a devastating 
regime in which approximately 1.7 million out of about 
7 million people lost their lives to mass execution, 
inhumane working conditions, and starvation. Almost 
every Cambodian who lived through the period lost at 
least a few members of their family.  The development 
of collectivism, the breaking of family ties, and the 
abolishment of the market economy along with a 
variety of civilian rights highlighted the main 
characteristics of Democratic Kampuchea. Alongside 
the execution of intellectuals and professionals, city 
and town dwellers were forced to resettle in the 
countryside where they became peasants to achieve the 
communist party’s (known to the local population as 
Angkar) unrealistic Four Years Plan to transform 
Cambodia into a land dominated by agrarian wealth. 
The regime was also known to have purged tens of 
thousands of its own cadres whom it suspected to be 
enemies at the infamous interrogation center S-21 in 
Phnom Penh. Sihanouk, on the other hand, was 
imprisoned in his own palace after the Khmer Rouge 
took power.
Border Disputes with the Neighbors
Once Pol Pot’s faction emerged amidst internal 
struggles among the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, 
border incursions to neighboring countries,  namely 
Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Thailand and Laos, 
intensified.13  In terms of territorial disputes, both 
Thailand and Vietnam had often been in conflict with 
Cambodia. Thailand’s conflicts with Cambodia were 
more numerous during the French colonial rule over 
Cambodia (1863–1953);  Cambodia’s disputes with 
Vietnam were more frequent during the Cold War era, 
specifically under the Khmer Rouge. Interestingly, 
Thailand’s territorial conflicts with Cambodia took 
place with the French who ruled Cambodia at the time, 
while Cambodia’s conflicts with Vietnam involved the 
two countries directly.14  
Before coming to power the Khmer Rouge were 
trained by Vietnamese communists. Once in power, 
however, they became hostile to their ex-comrades. 
The conflicts between the Khmer Rouge and the 
Vietnamese had been simmering since as early as May 
1975, when the Khmer Rouge attacked several 
Vietnamese-held islands in the Gulf of  Thailand with 
the hope of gaining the territories in the confusion of 
the final stages of  the Vietnamese civil war.15  The 
territorial dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam can 
be traced back to the French colonial rule of 
Indochina, if not earlier. Cambodia became a French 
protectorate in 1863, and in 1874 some Khmer 
provinces were incorporated by the French authorities 
to the separate colony of Cochin-China (now southern 
Vietnam, referred to as Kampuchea Krom by 
Cambodians).16  This legacy of dispute certainly 
influenced leaders on both sides. Pol Pot was 
suspicious of Vietnam’s territorial intentions, and this 
feeling of distrust deepened when Vietnam signed a 
treaty of cooperation with Laos in July 1977,  a move 
that Pol Pot interpreted as an attempt to encircle 
Cambodia and to reconstitute what had once been 
French Indochina.17  During these times, the Khmer 
Rouge demanded that Vietnam respect Cambodia’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and abandon the 
Indochinese Federation policy, which Vietnam denied 
pursuing. The Khmer Rouge also claimed parts of the 
Gulf of Thailand, where they wished to benefit from 
offshore oil deposits, while the Vietnamese rejected 
this claim for the simple reason that they had harbored 
similar hopes.18 Furthermore, skirmishes alongside the 
borders led leaders of both sides to distrust each 
other’s sincerity. In fact,  it is claimed that the Khmer 
Rouge had committed atrocities upon Vietnamese 
villagers in provinces along the Khmer border, killing 
222 people,  scorching 552 houses, and burning 134 
tons of paddy. Nguyen-vo estimates that Cambodians 
experienced equal losses through Vietnamese 
violence.19  Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge had 
strengthened their ties with the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), who had antagonistic feelings toward a 
pro-Soviet Vietnam. This  alliance allowed the Khmer 
Rouge to receive large quantities of arms,  ammunition, 
and other military equipment from China.20 
Democratic Kampuchea finally collapsed when some 
100,000 Vietnamese troops, together with the 
Kampuchean United Front of  National Salvation 
(KUFNS) (which comprised former DK’s officials who 
had defected to Vietnam in 1977 and 1978, and other 
Cambodians who had stayed in Vietnam during DK’s 
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rule) took over Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. A pro-
Vietnamese government,  comprising members of the 
KUFNS, known as the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK) was established in 1979, although it 
was not recognized by any non-Communist countries, 
except India. 21 Despite losing hold of the country, the 
Khmer Rouge were still far from complete defeat,  as 
they were able to retreat to the Thai borders and 
eventually strengthen themselves with the support of 
Thailand, China, ASEAN and the United States. 
Likewise,  Sihanouk managed to escape to China 
before the arrival of  the Vietnamese.22  The period 
1979–1991 marked the combination of the politics  of 
the Cold War and regional conflicts that, once again, 
were to shape the fate of Cambodia and its people. 
The Regional and International Factors
By early 1979, the conflict in Cambodia had gained 
momentum and international attention. In February 
1979, viewing the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as 
an act of Soviet encirclement, China accused Vietnam 
of “militarism, wild aggression and expansion” and 
launched an attack on the northern parts  of Vietnam 
that would eventually cause heavy destruction on both 
sides. The Khmer Rouge,  who had recently retreated 
to western parts  of Cambodia, managed to receive 
shelter along the Thai  borders because Thailand also 
feared Vietnam’s expansionism. The Khmer Rouge 
army was not the only resistance force to the Phnom 
Penh government after 1979. The Royalist group 
known as FUNCINPEC23  led by Prince Sihanouk and 
the republican group led by Sonn San were the other 
two major groups resisting the Vietnamese-backed 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The 
perception of Vietnam’s invasion to Cambodia as a 
threat to the security of the region also led ASEAN to 
oppose the PRK. In 1982, ASEAN, together with 
China, was able to persuade the three Cambodian 
resistance factions to form the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).24  Fear of 
Vietnamese and Soviet aggression in this period 
eventually internationalized the Cambodian conflict 
and produced two camps of rivals: the Cambodian 
CGDK (who continued to retain its  seat at the UN), 
China, ASEAN, and the United States on the one side, 
and Phnom Penh’s People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 
Vietnam, and the Soviet bloc on the other. 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the conflicts 
between the Phnom Penh government and the 
resistance forces and their respective supporters was 
the creation of the “K5 Plan,” adopted by the Phnom 
Penh government,  presumably under pressure from 
their Vietnamese advisors.  While the PRK was trying 
to consolidate their power and credibility inside the 
country, fighting continued between the People’s 
Army of Vietnam and the resistance forces, who were 
sheltered by Thailand and received military support 
from China. In 1984, the Politburo in Phnom Penh 
discussed “the mobilization of several hundred 
thousand Cambodian civilians to chop down forests, 
construct more roads, and lay down hundreds of 
kilometers of earthen walls, two-and-a-half-meter-deep 
spiked ditches,  barbed wire, and minefields.”25  This 
policy was codenamed the “K5 Plan” (Phenkar Kor 
Pram in Khmer). Evan Gottesman stated that the 
plan’s ultimate motive was to “build a Berlin Wall of 
sorts that would stretch along the Thai-Cambodian 
border and prevent resistance soldiers from 
infiltrating.”26  The attempt to seal the 829-Km long 
Cambodian-Thai border presumably required a great 
number of laborers.  In fact, in the first phase alone, 
90,362 laborers were involved in building the defense 
line.27  At the end of  1985, Vietnamese officials 
estimated the total K5 workers  for the year at 
150,000. 28 There seemed to be no clear figure of the 
total number of people conscripted for the K5 Plan, 
but Margaret Slocomb estimated the total number of 
conscriptions between late 1984 and mid 1987 at 
380,000.29  It is important to note here that a high 
number of people conscripted for the K5 Plan lost their 
lives to malaria and landmines. This strategy of border 
defense was not something new. During the reign of 
Minh Mang, between 1820 and 1841, Vietnam 
colonized Cambodia,  and, to enhance its security 
against Thai attacks, Minh Mang ordered the digging 
of the Vinh Te canal in 1820–21.  The harsh treatment 
of the Vietnamese overlords caused deep resentment 
among the Cambodians in a similar way that the K5 
undermined the popularity of the PRK and the 
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.30
The K5 Plan was not the only manifestation of 
geopolitical cruelty that caused misfortune among 
Cambodians. Immediately following the Vietnamese 
invasion, tens of thousands of Cambodians in the west 
fled the country and took refuge in Thailand. Facing 
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the influx of refugees without immediate support from 
the international community,  Thai  authorities 
forcefully repatriated as many as  45,000 Cambodian 
refugees back to their country through the cliffs full of 
landmines at Preah Vihear, the “no man’s land” 
between the two countries.  Horrifically, those who 
refused to go down the cliffs were mercilessly shot by 
Thai  soldiers.31  After making their way through 
minefields and enduring extreme hunger, receiving 
food aid from Thai villagers and sometimes by the 
Vietnamese soldiers and Khmer villagers on the other 
side, only about two thousand refugees were eventually 
rescued by the U.S. Embassy and the UNHCR.32 
Another harsh effect of geopolitical conflict facing 
Cambodia during this period was the heavy use of 
landmines by all sides. The history of  planting 
landmines dated back to the Vietnam War when 
Vietnam, and the U.S. in response, planted landmines 
on neutral Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge also set up 
mines during the early 1970s to seal off their “liberated 
zones” against the Khmer Republic’s army, and along 
the borders  with Vietnam and Thailand once they were 
in power. The number dramatically rose during the 
Vietnamese occupation, especially after the withdrawal 
of the Vietnamese army from Cambodia in 1989, which 
left the Phnom Penh government to defend itself 
against the CGDK’s forces. In fact, Eric Stover (a 
freelance writer and consultant to Human Rights 
Watch and Physicians  for Human Rights) and Rae 
McGrath (director of the Mine Advisory Group) wrote 
a report in 1992 and referred to this  process of heavy 
planting of landmines by all fighting forces as “the 
cowards’ war.”33  The sheer magnitude of devastation 
for Cambodian civilians is  so remarkable that one out 
of every 240 Cambodians is  estimated to be the victim 
of a landmine in modern Cambodia.34
Only with the end of the Cold War did the conflicts 
in Cambodia gradually come to an end. The decline of 
Soviet aid made the stationing of Vietnamese troops in 
Cambodia difficult, for Vietnam was experiencing both 
its own problems at home and international isolation 
during the last decade thanks to its invasion of 
Cambodia in 1979. Peace talks among Cambodians in 
the late 1980s finally resulted in the Paris Peace 
Agreement in October 1991, which was designed to 
allow the establishment of the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia as a peacekeeping 
force to ensure the peaceful process of the 1993 
National Election. Cambodia’s politics thereafter were 
largely dominated by internal conflicts that resulted in 
the 1997 coup, while regional cooperation was further 
enhanced when Cambodia became the tenth member 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in April 
1999.
Conclusion
This paper was written with an attempt to illustrate 
the relationship between Cambodia’s tragedies and its 
geopolitical position during the Cold War period. 
After gaining independence, Sihanouk’s efforts to 
keep Cambodia neutral were undermined by its 
complex geopolitical situation. The Vietnam War that 
erupted in the 1960s spilled over into Cambodia,  which 
eventually led to the rise of Democratic Kampuchea, 
the deadliest regime Cambodia had experienced in its 
entire history.  Once in power, the Khmer Rouge 
provoked border disputes–a legacy of French colonial 
rule in Indochina–with Cambodia’s  neighbors that 
would lead to its own demise.  The invasion by Vietnam 
into Cambodia and the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea did not leave Cambodia at 
peace,  for the country became a battleground that 
served the interests of bigger powers in the region and 
beyond.  It is not the aim of  this essay to attribute 
responsibility for the conflicts described to purely 
geographical or ideological factors occurring in 
Cambodia. Neither does this paper wish to suggest that 
external actors and circumstances are solely 
responsible for this  tragic era in Cambodian history.! 
Clearly, geographical and political factors, both 
internal and external to Cambodia, shaped this chapter 
in history. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
whole matrices of Cambodia’s geopolitical position in 
the Cold War era, in order to better understand and 
contextualize the misfortune of the country and its 
people.
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